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Programme 2004: Atelier d’économie des ressources naturelles et de l’environnement

Hiver 2004  (Archives)

Lieu : McGill University
855 Sherbrooke Ouest, Pavillon Leacock 429
9:00 – 12:00

Affiche de l’atelier

16 avril / April 16 (exceptionnellement à 10:00)
• Responsable / In charge : Olli TAHVONEN (Finnish Forest Research Institute – MELTA – University of Helsinki)
• Sujet / Topic : Optimal Harvesting of Forest Age Classes: A Survey of Some Recent Results

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Tahvonen, Olli
, “Optimal Harvesting of Forest Age Classes: A Survey of Some Recent Results”.

2 avril / April 2
• Responsable / In charge : 1) Alain-Désiré NIMUBONA (HEC Montréal)
• Sujet / Topic : Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy
• Responsable / In charge : 2) Bodhi SENGUPTA (McGill University)
• Sujet / Topic : Some Aspects of Environmental Federalism
• Responsable / In charge : 3) Éric-Paul COUTURE (McGill University)
• Sujet / Topic : Output Responses of Exhaustible Resource Extractors

1) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Segerson, Kathleen et Thomas J. Miceli
, “Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 36, 1998, 109-130.
Maxwell, John W., Thomas P. Lyon et Steven C. Hackett, “Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism”, Journal of Law and Economics XLIII, 2000, 583-617.
Lyon, Thomas P. et John W. Maxwell, “Self-Regulation, Taxation and Public Voluntary Environmental Agreements”, Journal of Public Economics 87, 2003, 1453-1486.

2) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Besley, T. et S. Coate
, “Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Approach”, Journal of Public Economics 87, 2003, 2611-2637.
Dixit, A. et J. Londregan, “Fiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politics”, Journal of Public Economics 68, 1998, 153-180.
Oates, W. et R.M. Schwab, “Economic Competition among Jurisdictions : Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?”, Journal of Public Economics 35, 1998, 333-354.

26 mars / March 26
• Responsable / In charge : 1) Amrita Ray CHAUDHURI (McGill University)
• Sujet / Topic : How to Mitigate the Judgment Proof Problem?
• Responsable / In charge : 2) David KELLY (University of Miami)
• Sujet / Topic : Voluntary Overcompliance with Firms as Quasi-Governmental Institutions

1) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Pitchford, Rohan
, “How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk”, American Economic Review 85(5), décembre 1995, 1171-1186.
Pitchford, Rohan, “How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Reply”, American Economic Review 91(3), juin 2001, 739-745.
Balkenborg, Dieter, “How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment”, American Economic Review 91(3), juin 2001, 731-738.
Shavell, Stephen, “A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation”, RAND Journal of Economics 15(2), 1984, 271-280.
Boyer, M. et D. Porrini, “Modelling the Choice between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare”, Canadian Journal of Economics, à paraître.
Brooks, R., “Liability and Organisational Choice”, Journal of Law and Economics 45(1), avril 2002, 91-125.

2) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Kelly, David, “Voluntary Overcompliance with Firms as Quasi-Governmental Institutions”, 2004.

19 mars / March 19
• Responsable / In charge : 1) Soham BAKSI (McGill University)
• Sujet / Topic : Polluting Firm Location under Economies of Scale and Convex Environmental Damage
• Responsable / In charge : 2) Graham DAVIS (University of Colorado)
• Sujet / Topic : Selling and Managing Offshore Oil Leases: A Real Options Analysis
• Responsable / In charge : 3) Jun ZHOU (McGill University)
• Sujet / Topic : The disparity between WTP and WTA

1) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Markusen, J.R., E.R. Morey et N. Olewiler
, “Competition in Regional Environmental Policies when Plant Locations are Endogenous”, Journal of Public Economics 56, 1995, 55-77.
Petrakis, E. et A. Xepapadeas, “Location Decisions of a Polluting Firm and the Time Consistency of Environmental Policy”, Resource and Energy Economics 25(2), 2003, 197-214.

2) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Davis, Graham A. et Radford Schantz
, “Selling and Managing Offshore Oil Leases: A Real Options Analysis”, 2004.

3) Bibliographie / Bibliography :

Zhao, Jinhua et Cathy Kling
, “Willingness-to-Pay, Compensating Variation, and the Cost of Commitment”, Economic Inquiry, forthcoming.
Horowitz, John K. et Kenneth E. McConnell, “A Review of WTA / WTP Studies”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 44, 2002, 426-447.

12 mars / March 12
• Responsable / In charge : 1) Markus HERRMANN (Université de Montréal, CIREQ)
• Sujet / Topic : The Economics of Resistance to Antibiotics
• Responsable / In charge : 2) Stephen CHOU (McGill University)
• Sujet / Topic : Global Environmental Management
• Responsable / In charge : 3) Mehdi ZAHAF (HEC Montréal)
• Sujet / Topic : A Differential Game of Joint Implementation of Environmental Projects

1) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Laxminarayan, R. et G.M. Brown, “Economics of Antibiotic Resistance: A Theory of Optimal Use”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42(2), 2001, 183-206.
Rowthorn, Robert et Gardner M. Brown, “Using Antibiotics When Resistance is Renewable”, dans Battling Resistance to Antibiotics and Pesticides: An Economic Approach, Resources for the Future, sous la direction de R. Laxminarayan, Washington, DC, 2003, 42-62.
Wilen, E. James et Siwa Msangi, “Dynamics of Antibiotic Use: Ecological versus Interventionist Strategies to Manage Resistance to Antibiotics”, dans Battling Resistance to Antibiotics and Pesticides: An Economic Approach, Resources for the Future, sous la direction de R. Laxminarayan, Washington, DC, 2003, 17-41.

2) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Kiyono, Kazuharu et Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, “Global Environmental Management and Bargaining: Strategic Public Abatement Investment Incentives”.

3) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Dudek, D.J. et J.B. Wiener, “Joint Implementation, Transaction Costs and Climate Change”, OECD Economic Outlook, OECD/GD(96)173, 1996.
Janssen, J., “Self-Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism Contracts”, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 1999, 14-99.
Dockner, J.E. et N.V. Long, “International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25, 1993, 13-29.
Kaitala, V. et M. Pohjola, “Sustainable International Agreements on Greenhouse Warming: A Game Theory Study”, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games 2, 1995, 67-87.
Zahaf, Mehdi, “A Differential Game of Joint Implementation of Environmental Projects”, 2004.
Zahaf, Mehdi, “Presentation Slides”, 2004.

5 mars / March 5
• Responsable / In charge : Hassan BENCHEKROUN (McGill University, CIREQ)
• Sujet / Topic : Sequential Movers in Natural Resource Exploitation

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Benchekroun, Hassan, “Sequential Movers in Natural Resources: Presentation Slides”.
Groot, Fons, Cees Withagen et Aart de Zeeuw
, “Strong Time-Consistency in the Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model”, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28(2), novembre 2003, 287-306.
Groot, Fons, Cees Withagen et Aart de Zeeuw, “Note on the Open-Loop von Stackelberg Equilibrium in the Cartel versus Fringe Model”, Economic Journal 102(415), novembre 1992, 1478-1484.
Newbery, David M., “The Open-Loop von Stackelberg Equilibrium in the Cartel versus Fringe Model: A Reply”, Economic Journal 102(415), novembre 1992, 1485-1487.
Danyang, Xie, “On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games”, Journal of Economic Theory 76(2), octobre 1997, 412-430.
Karp, Larry et In Ho Lee, “Time-Consistent Policies”, Journal of Economic Theory 112(2), octobre 2003, 353-364.
Dockner, Engelbert J. et al., “Differential Games in Economics and Management Science”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: New York, chapitre 5, 2000.

27 février / February 27 Congé / Break
20 février / February 20
• Responsable / In charge : Andrew LEACH (HEC)
• Sujet / Topic : Uncertainty and the Economics of Global Warming

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Kelly, David L. et Charles D. Kolstad, “Bayesian Learning, Growth, and Pollution”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23, 1999, 491-518,
Leach, Andrew J., “The Climate Change Learning Curve”, 2003.
Nordhaus, William D. et Zili Yang, “A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies”, American Economic Review 86(4), septembre 1996, 741-765.

13 février / February 13
• Responsable / In charge :
• Sujet / Topic :
1) Stephen SALANT (University of Michigan)
A Partnership Solution to the Tragedy of the Commons?
• Responsable / In charge : 2) Stephan SCHOTT (Carleton University)
• Sujet / Topic : Output Sharing Among Groups Exploiting Common Property Resources

1) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Heintzelman, Martin D. et Stephen W. Salant
, “A Solution to the Tragedy of the Commons and a Problem for Anti-Trust Authorities”, février 2004.

2) Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Amartya, K. Sen
, “Labour Allocation in a Cooperative Enterprise”, Review of Economic Studies 33(4), 1966, 361-371.
Buckley, Neil, Stuart Mestelman, R. Andrew Muller et Stephan Schott, “Output Sharing Among Groups Exploiting Common Pool Resources”, 2003.
Schott, Stephan, “Output-Sharing as a Common-Pool Resource Management Instrument”, 2003.

6 février / February 6
• Responsable / In charge : Ngo Van LONG (McGill University, CIREQ)
• Sujet / Topic : Corrupt Local Governments as Resource Farmers: The Helping Hand and the Grabbing Hand

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Dalgic, Engin et Ngo Van Long, “Corrupt Local Governments as Resource Farmers: The Helping Hand and the Grabbing Hand”.
Frye, T. et A. Shleifer, “The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 87, 1997, 354-358.
Keen, M. et C. Kotsogiannis, “Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations”, Journal of Public Economic Theory 5, 2003, 177-199.
McKinnon, R., “Spontaneous Order on the Road Back from Socialism: An Asian Perspective”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 80, 1992, 31-36.
Montinola, G., Y. Qian et B. Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China”, World Politics 48, 1995, 50-81.
Olson, M., “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”, American Political Science Review 87, 1993, 567-576.
Olson, M., “Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships”, Basic Books, 2000, New York.
Tornell, Aaron et Velasco Andres, “The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?”, Journal of Political Economy 100(6), décembre 1992, 1208-1231.
Tornell, Aaron et Philip R. Lane, “The Voracity Effect”, American Economic Review 89(1), mars 1999, 22-46.
Zhuravskaya, E.V., “Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style”, Journal of Public Economics 76(3), 2000, 337-368.

30 janvier / January 30
• Responsable / In charge : Pierre LASSERRE (UQAM, CIREQ)
• Sujet / Topic : Biodiversity

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Brock, W.A. et A. Xepapadeas, “Valuing Biodiversity from an Economic Perspective: A Unified Economic, Ecological, and Genetic Approach”, American Economic Review, 2003, 1597-1614.
Polasky, S.C. Costello et A. Solow, “The Economics of Biodiversity”, Handbook of Environmental Economics, 2003 (chapitre à paraître).
Weitzman, M.L., “Economic Profitability versus Ecological Entropy”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, février 2000, 237-263.

23 janvier / January 23
• Responsable / In charge : Robert CAIRNS (McGill University, CIREQ)
• Sujet / Topic : Nonrenewable Resource Exploitation with Production Constraints and the r% Rule

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Hotelling, Harold, “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources”, Journal of Political Economy 39(2), avril 1931, 137-175.
Solow, Robert M., “The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics”, American Economic Review 64(2), mai 1974, 1-14.
Campbell, Harry F., “The Effect of Capital Intensity on the Optimal Rate of Extraction of a Mineral Deposit”, Canadian Journal of Economics (13)2, mai 1980, 349-356.
Adelman, M.A., “Mineral Depletion, with Special Reference to Petroleum”, Review of Economics and Statistics 72(1), février 1990, 1-10.

16 janvier / January 16
• Responsable / In charge : Louis HOTTE (Université de Namur)
• Sujet / Topic : Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Hotte, Louis, Fabrice Valognes et Tanguy van Ypersele, “Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach”.

For a simple, early, general equilibrium model of crime with private protection that shows that public enforcement of property rights can improve the lot of all individuals:
Skogh, G. et C. Stuart, “A Contractarian Theory of Property Rights and Crime”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1982.

On the properties of appropriation functions:
Skaperdas, Stergios, “Contest Success Functions”, Economic Theory, 1996.
Hirshleifer, Jack, “Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs Difference Models of Relative Success”, Public Choice, 1989.

For a representative model of conflict using game theory:
Skaperdas, Stergios, “Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights”, The American Economic Review 82(4), septembre 1992, 720-739.

On the analogy between the crime payoff at different locations and the free access to resources:
Gordon, H. Scott, “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery”, The Journal of Political Economy 62(2), avril 1954, 124-142.

For a review of empirical results and issues on crime:
Witte, Ann Dryden et Robert Witt, “What We Spend and what We Get: Public and Private Provision of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice”, WP8204, NBER, 2001.

9 janvier / January 9
• Responsable / In charge : Gérard GAUDET (Université de Montréal, CIREQ)
• Sujet / Topic : Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Nonrenewable Resources

Bibliographie / Bibliography :
Chakravorty, Ujjayant et Darrell L. Krulce, “Heterogeneous Demand and Order of Resource Extraction”, Econometrica 62(6), novembre 1994, 1445-1452.
Chakravorty, Ujjayant, Darrell L. Krulce et James Roumasset, “Specialization and Nonrenewable Resources: Ricardo Meets Ricardo”.
Gaudet, Gérard, Michel Moreaux et Stephen W. Salant, “Intertemporal Depletion of Resources Sites by Spatially Distributed Users”, The American Economics Review 91(4), septembre 2001, 1149-1159.
Kolstad, Charles, “Hotelling Rents in Hotelling Space: Product Differentiation in Exhaustible Resource Markets”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 26(2), mars 1994, 163-180.

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