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Incentives in Experiments : A Theoretical Analysis

Microeconomics Seminar 2016-2017
joint with the Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal

room C-6149 (U. de Montréal, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150, rue Jean-Brillant)

Organizers : Deniz Dizdar (U. of Montreal) and Sean Horan (U. of Montreal)

If we assume only monotonicity (dominated gambles are never chosen), paying for one random period (the RPS mechanism) is typically the only incentive compatible way to pay subjects. Paying every period is similarly justified if we assume a ‘no complementarities at the top’ (NCaT) condition. Which should you use? That’s your decision.

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