CIREQ-McGill Seminar 2021-2022
joint with the Department of Economics, McGill University
In person : Leacock 429 (McGill University, 855, rue Sherbrooke Ouest)
Organizer : Leonie Baumann (McGill University)
RÉSUMÉ : Given demand data for a group of agents, we seek to make counterfactual welfare statements. Our main result considers whether there are convex preferences for which some candidate allocation is Pareto optimal. We show that this candidate allocation is possibly efficient if and only if it is efficient for the incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations and convexity. Similar ideas are used to address related questions: when the Kaldor criterion may be used to make welfare comparisons, what prices can be Walrasian equilibrium prices, and the possibility of a representative consumer when the income distribution is endogenous.