The Environmental and Natural Resource Economics Workshop is supported by the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO), the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ), the Réseau de recherche en économie circulaire du Québec (RRECQ) and the Fonds de recherche du Québec (FRQ).
This workshop is intended for researchers and doctoral students in economics who are interested in resource and environmental economics.
The workshop will be led by a team of researchers composed of Geir B. Asheim (Oslo University), Hassan Benchekroun (McGill University), Sophie Bernard (Polytechnique Montréal), Etienne Billette de Villemeur (Université de Lille, UQAM), Robert Cairns (McGill University), Justin Leroux (HEC Montréal), and Charles Séguin (UQAM).
* Information on previous workshops can be found here.
Workshop Venue
1130, rue Sherbrooke Ouest, suite 1400
Montréal, QC H3A 2M8
Registration
As seats are limited, registration is mandatory.
Speakers
Cees Withagen (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Open-Loop von Stackelberg in the Cartel-Fringe Model with Renewables (with Hassan Benchekroun & Gerard van der Meiden)
Abstract: We consider the open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-fringe model with renewables. Hence, the main contribution consists in extending the well-known cartel-versus-fringe model so as to include renewables. We also perform a numerical welfare analysis.
Biography: Cees Withagen (1950) got his master’s degree (cum laude) in econometrics with a specialisation in mathematical economics at Tilburg University in 1974. In 1984 he got his PhD degree (cum laude) also at Tilburg University.
He is now professor-emeritus of environmental economics at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Spatial Economics in the School of Business and Economics. He is also fellow of Tinbergen Institute and CentER (Tilburg University).
Simon Elgersma (Doctoral Candidate, Université de Groningen), Mitigation, Adaptation and Cooperation in Response to Climate Disaster
Abstract: We consider the tradeoff between mitigation and adaptation in a transboundary pollution game with an environmental regime shift. Countries can lower their emissions to decrease the likelihood that a regime shift takes place or proactively invest in adaptive capital to reduce the impact of the regime shift. We solve for the social planner outcome and the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) and study how the option to adapt affects incentives to mitigate, precautionary behavior and welfare. In the social planner outcome, adaptation complements mitigation and increases welfare, but in the non-cooperative outcome adaptation crowds out mitigation and lowers welfare. Finally, we introduce efficient procedures to numerically calculate MPNE in differential games that cannot be solved analytically.
Biography: My name is Simon Elgersma and I am a second-year PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Groningen in The Netherlands. I hold a MPhil (equiv. MRes) in Economics and a BSc in Econometrics and Operations Research from the University of Groningen. My research interests are in the fields of Environmental and Resource Economics and (Dynamic) Game Theory, and I am also interested in studying Numerical Methods to solve problems arising in these fields.
