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Program: CONFERENCE ON AUCTIONS

CONFÉRENCE SUR LES ENCHÈRES / CONFERENCE ON AUCTIONS

PROGRAMME / PROGRAM


Vendredi 28 octobre

 

Friday, October 28


14:00 – 15:00

Opening Lecture

Philip Reny (University of Chicago)
On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games

15:00 – 16:00

David McAdams (MIT, Sloan School of Management)
Identification and Testable Restrictions in Private Value Multi-Unit Auctions

16:00 – 16:30

Pause / Break

16:30 – 17:30

James Chapman, Harry J. Paarsch (University of Iowa), David McAdams (Sloan School of Management, MIT)
Multi-Unit, Sealed-Bid, Discriminatory-Price Auctions

17:30 – 18:30

Philippe Février (INSEE)
Semiparametric Identification and Estimation of Common Value Auctions

20:00

Banquet: Restaurant Laloux (sur invitation seulement / by invitation only)


Samedi 29 octobre

 

Saturday, October 29


8:00 – 8:30

Petit-déjeuner / Breakfast : CIRANO

8:30 – 9:30

Patrick Bajari (University of Michigan), Stephanie Houghton (Duke University), Steve Tadelis (University of California Berkeley, Haas School of Business)
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts : An Empirical Analysis

9:30 – 10:30

Jeremy Fox (University of Chicago), Patrick Bajari (University of Michigan)
Complementarities and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum

10:30 – 11:00

Pause / Break

11:00 – 12:00

Jean-Francois Richard, Wayne-Roy Gayle (University of Pittsburgh)
Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric First Price Independent Private Values Auctions

12:00 – 14:00

Lunch : CIRANO

14:00 – 15:00

Tong Li (Vanderbilt University), Xiaoyong Zheng (North Carolina State University)
Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions : Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions

15:00 – 16:00

Unjy Song (University of British Columbia)
Nonparametric Estimation of an eBay Auction Model with an Unknown Number of Bidders

16:00 – 17:30

Closing Lecture

Quang Vuong, Isabelle Perrigne (Penn State University), Emmanuel Guerre (Université Paris VI)
Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions under Exclusion Restrictions

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