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Webinaire CIREQ-CIRANO en économie de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles

L’Atelier CIREQ-CIRANO d’économie de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles est organisé en collaboration avec le CIRANO. Il est conjoint avec les départements d’économique des universités de Montréaldu Québec à MontréalMcGill et HEC Montréal.

Cet événement s’adresse aux chercheurs et étudiants de doctorat qui s’intéressent à l’économie des ressources naturelles et de l’environnement.

*  Pour en savoir plus sur les ateliers précédents, veuillez cliquer ici.

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CONFÉRENCIERS

yassin

Kareman Yassin (Université d’Ottawa)
Peer Effects in Residential Energy Consumption
This paper examines the spatial peer effects generated by Canada’s largest home energy efficiency retrofit program and its impact on energy consumption within a city in the Prairie provinces. Utilizing a decade of monthly data on energy consumption, tax assessments, program participation, and house audits in the city, I demonstrate that neighbors in close proximity to energy efficiency retrofitted homes reduce their monthly natural gas and electricity consumption by an average of 2.4% and 1% respectively. Similar results are obtained when using three different comparison groups. Notably, visible retrofits such as windows, doors, and exterior wall insulation have a three-and-a-half times stronger impact on peer energy savings compared to less visible retrofits like natural gas furnace upgrades. Additionally, the effect diminishes as the distance to neighbors increases.

chiappinelli

Olga Chiappinelli (Economics, University of Barcelona)
Optimal Green Public Procurement (with Gyula Seres (National University of Singapore)
Green Public Procurement is a potentially powerful policy tool to stimulate investment in green technologies. However, it is unclear how it should be implemented. To contribute to this debate, we analyze the procurer’s problem using a mechanism design approach. Our analysis shows that the optimal auction mechanism for an environmentally concerned procurer incentivizes investment by low-cost bidders. We also show that a discount-based Green Public Procurement preferential program can implement this optimal outcome.

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